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Public	Sector	Banks	in	India:	Revisiting	regulatory
and	corporate	governance	in	the	light	of	the	PNB
scam
The	Punjab	National	Bank	scam,	India’s	largest	banking	fraud,	has	shed	light	on	the	necessity	for	an
overhaul	of	regulatory	and	corporate	governance	practices	in	Indian	public	sector	banks.	Param
Pandya	gives	an	overview	of	the	history	of	regulation	and	governance	of	PSBs	and	proposes	some
solutions	in	the	light	of	the	increasing	number	of	scams.	
Banking	frauds	in	India	have	re-emphasised	the	pitfalls	of	the	regulatory	arbitrage	in	case	of	Public
Sector	Banks	(PSBs).	An	IiAS	study	reveals	that	in	FY17,	the	Indian	banking	sector	reported	12,553	frauds
aggregating	to	INR	181.7	billion,	of	which	PSBs	reported	frauds	worth	INR	162.3	billion,	a	whopping	89	per	cent	of
the	total	value.	Further,	RTI	data	states	that	21	PSBs	lost	INR	25,775	crores	in	bank	frauds	in	FY18.	However,	the
fraud	that	hit	Punjab	National	Bank	(PNB),	one	of	the	largest	Indian	banks,	stole	the	thunder.
PNB	on	February	14,	2018,	made	a	disclosure	to	stock	exchanges	that	a	fraud	to	the	tune	of	$1.8	billion	had	been
detected.	Subsequently,	the	share	price	of	PNB	nosedived	more	than	10	per	cent	in	a	day.	The	fraud,	orchestrated
by	certain	PNB	officials	who	had	fraudulently	issued	Letters	of	Undertaking	(LOUs)	to	Gitanjali	Gems	and	Firestar,
two	companies	which	are	controlled	by	Nirav	Modi,	sent	tremors	through	the	Indian	markets.
The	LOU,	a	common	instrument	in	international	trade,	is	used	to	obtain	finance	from	overseas	banks	to	meet
payment	obligations.	The	issuing	bank,	in	this	case,	PNB,	is	required	to	make	payment	to	an	accepting	overseas
bank	that	holds	the	LOU.	All	procedural	checks	put	in	before	an	LOU	may	be	issued	were	violated	by	PNB	when
LOUs	were	issued	between	2008-2014	to	Gitanjali	Gems	and	Firestar.
PNB	on	February	14,	2018,	made	a	disclosure	to	stock	exchanges	that	a	fraud	to	the	tune	of
$1.8	billion	had	been	detected.	Subsequently,	the	share	price	of	PNB	nosedived	more	than	10
per	cent	in	a	day.		Image	credit:	Wikimedia	Commons/Panoramio/	Deepak	Das	/CC	BY	3.0
An	IIM	Bangalore	Paper	(2016)	finds	a	co-relation	between	rising	level	of	non-performing	assets	(NPA)	and	frauds	in
PSBs.	Frauds	may	accelerate	the	NPA	crisis	leading	to	a	perilous	effect	on	the	Indian	economy	and	of	the	world	at
large.	
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The	present	depiction	has	raised	two	fundamental	issues	—		first,	the	inadequacy	of	corporate	governance
framework	for	PSBs	in	India	and	second,	the	lack	of	adequate	regulatory	oversight	over	PSBs	by	India’s	central
bank,	the	Reserve	Bank	of	India	(RBI).
Regulatory	and	Governance	Issues
Various	committees	have	raised	concerns	over	the	regulation	and	governance	of	PSBs.	Below	are	the	key	findings
and	recommendations	of	these	committees:
P	J	Nayak	Committee	Report	(2014)
Key	Findings
PSBs	are	subject	to	directions	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	Government	of	India	(GOI).	This	dichotomy	in	the
regulation	of	PSBs	is	discriminatory.
RBI	should	be	the	sole	regulator	for	PSBs	and	private	banks.
Recommendations
Increase	independence	of	PSB’s	board	of	directors	and	level	playing	field	for	private	banks	&	PSBs.
Establish	Banking	Investment	Company	(BIC)	–	a	holding	company	for	shares	of	PSBs.
Until	the	BIC	is	formed,	establish	Bank	Board	Bureau	(BBB)	to	streamline	the	process	for	appointment	of
directors	of	PSBs.	At	a	later	stage,	BBB’s	role	must	be	transferred	to	the	BIC.
The	proposal	for	setting	up	BBB	was	accepted	by	the	GOI	and	BBB	started	functioning	on	April	1,	2016.
BBB’s	‘Compendium	of	Recommendations’	(March	2017)
Key	Findings
Need	for	an	ownership-neutral	regulatory	environment	without	requiring	the	GOI	to	completely	divest	its	holding
in	PSBs.
Recommendations
Companies	Act,	2013	(CA	Act)	to	have	an	overriding	effect	over	special	statutes	which	established	PSBs.
Provisions	of	the	Banking	Regulations	Act,	1949	would	prevail	in	case	of	conflict.
World	Bank	–	Detailed	Assessment	of	Observance—Basel	Core	Principles	for	Effective	Banking	Supervision
(January	2018)
Key	Findings
The	RBI’s	legal	powers	to	supervise	and	regulate	PSBs	are	also	constrained.
RBI	cannot	remove	PSB	directors	or	management,	who	are	appointed	by	GOI.
RBI	cannot	force	a	merger	or	trigger	the	liquidation	of	a	PSB.
RBI	has	limited	legal	authority	to	hold	PSB	Boards	accountable	regarding	strategic	direction,	risk	profiles,
assessment	of	management,	and	compensation.
These	issues	were	also	raised	by	the	RBI	Governor	Urjit	Patel	in	his	maiden	speech	in	relation	to	the	role	of	the	RBI
in	the	aftermath	of	the	PNB	fraud.
Recommendations
Legal	reforms	are	highly	desirable	to	empower	the	RBI	to	fully	exercise	the	same	responsibilities	for	PSBs	as
apply	to	private	banks,	and	to	ensure	a	level	playing	field	in	supervisory	enforcement.
Regulatory	response
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Prior	to	the	PNB	fraud	disclosure,	the	RBI	in	January	2018	had	comprehensively	enhanced	the	requirements	to
provide	for	disclosure	of	non-fund	based	contingent	liabilities	like	a	LOUs,	guarantee	etc.	As	a	quick	response	to	the
PNB	fraud,	RBI	discontinued	the	issuance	of	LOUs	for	trade	credits	for	imports	into	India	with	immediate	effect.
Further,	RBI	has	also	directed	banks	to	integrate	SWFIT	and	core	banking	systems.	It	has	also	constituted	a
committee	headed	by	YH	Malegam,	a	former	member	of	the	Central	Board	of	Directors	of	RBI,	to	look	into	the
reasons	for	high	divergence	observed	in	asset	classification,	various	incidents	of	fraud	and	necessary	interventions
(also	in	terms	of	information	technology)	to	prevent	such	frauds.
The	way	forward
Fortunately,	frauds	have	often	lead	to	major	changes	in	the	regulatory	and	governance	landscape	in	India.	The
Satyam	scam	(2009)	where	the	Chairman	of	Satyam	Computer	Service	Limited	confessed	to	having	falsified	the
financial	statements,	including	by	showing	fictitious	cash	assets	of	over	$	1	billion.	This	scam	led	to	a	complete
overhaul	of	the	corporate	law	and	governance	in	India.	For	the	PNB	fraud	to	turn	out	to	be	the	Satyam	for	PSBs,	in
retrospect,	will	require	a	transformation	in	the	Indian	banking	sector.
On	the	governance	front,	first,	it	is	important	that	an	ownership-neutral	banking	law	is	in	force	to	ensure	PSBs	and
private	banks	are	on	the	same	footing.	Second,	gradually,	GOI	should	transition	its	holdings	in	the	PSBs	into	BIC	and
let	independent	boards	govern.	A	study	reveals	that	despite	paying	high	audit	fees,	the	quantum	of	fraud	in	PSBs
tends	to	be	on	the	higher	side.	On	the	regulatory	front,	this	necessitates	a	review	of	the	internal	financial	controls	and
role	of	auditors	of	PSBs.
On	April	20,	2018,	the	Financial	Stability	Board	released	a	tool-kit	consisting	of	19	tools	for	firms	and	regulators	to
fight	with	misconduct	risk.	These	tools	reflect	the	growing	consensus	that	more	aggressive	measures	are	required	to
prevent	or	mitigate	misconduct	by	financial	institutions	in	the	ex-ante	sense.	These	tools	aim	to	address	three	key
areas	of	misconduct	risk:	(1)	The	role	of	(poor)	culture	in	driving	misconduct	within	a	financial	institution;	(2)	Lack	of
individual	responsibility	and	accountability;	and	(3)	The	‘rolling	bad	apples’	phenomenon	through	which	individuals
who	engage	in	misconduct	move	between	financial	institutions	without	their	misconduct	being	disclosed	to	their	new
employer.
The	individual	responsibility	and	accountability	of	senior	managers	form	a	cornerstone	of	misconduct	risk
prevention/mitigation	framework.	Various	senior	manager	accountability	regimes	in	UK,	Hong	Kong,	and	Australia
adopt	the	‘prescriptive’	approach	which	requires	financial	institutions	to	clearly	lay	out	their	organisational	structures,
designate	responsible	officers,	set	out	standards	for	conduct	and	hold	such	officers	accountable.	In	light	of	the	FSB
tool-kit,	the	Monetary	Authority	of	Singapore,	on	April	26,	2018,	released	a	consultation	paper	proposing	a
Guidelines	on	Individual	Accountability	and	Conduct.	The	RBI	had	issued	the	Master	Direction	on	Frauds,	however,
in	light	of	current	scenario,	the	same	be	revisited	or	overhauled,	after	careful	consideration	of	the	global	regimes,	to
make	misconduct	risk	prevention/mitigation	framework	more	robust.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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